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POST-WAR PROTECTION OF
FREEDOM OF OPINION
A Study of Supreme CourtAttitudes
RAYMON T. JOHNSON*

Introduction
The English struggle to vindicate the rights of the individual from
Magna Carta in 1215 through and beyond the Bill of Rights of 1689
was not without influence in shaping the American conception of personal liberty. It would be error to assume, however, that such influence
was of a controlling character. The inhabitants of the New World
were more influenced by environment than they were impressed by
history. Pioneer conditions, reacting upon a middle-class people, produced a point of view unhampered by conventions and unfettered by
traditions. The American people were ideally conditioned to respond
to the eighteenth century philosophy of natural rights.
This response found expression in the Declaration of Independence
wherein "self-evident" truths, "created equal," "unalienable rights,"
"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness" and other magic phrases
were marshalled to impress the "opinions of mankind." That the opinions of mankind were profoundly affected by this revolutionary challenge to the existing political order is the uncontroverted conclusion

of history. This vital document ushered in a new era of expanding personal liberty.
The outbreak of the World War, however, marked the end of this
era in which more peoples had achieved some decent measure of in-

dividual freedom than in any other period that has been recorded.
Since that time the world has been subject to political and economic
distractions of an unprecedented nature. Much that had been gained
seems definitely lost. The prospect that the pendulum of liberty will
continue on the back-swing appears increasingly likely. In an interrelated world it is difficult for a particular country to run counter to
the orbital course of events. The purpose of this study is to examine
the attitude of the Supreme Court in handling the delicate problem of
freedom of individual opinion during this post-war period of social,
economic and political upheaval. It is hoped that the examination will
accurately reflect the extent to which the First and Fourteenth Amend*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
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ments create a zone of constitutional immunity for the protection of
this fundamental right from governmental invasion.
War-Time Espionage Act
Freedom of discussion and privilege of debate are indispensable
requisites to the orderly functioning of democratic institutions. Without them there could be no crystalization of opinion to chart the course
of responsible government. The first provision of the Federal Bill of
Rights was designed to safeguard freedom of speech, press and assembly from restrictions by the National Government.' In 1917 Congress
passed the Espionage Act, making it criminal to obstruct or conspire
to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States,
During the war numerous convictions were procured under this Act
and several of them were reviewed by the Supreme Court in cases disposed of by that tribunal soon after the cessation of hostilities.
In March, igig, the Court decided the Schenck,2 Frohwerk,3 and
Debs4 cases, upholding convictions under the Espionage Act. All three
decisions were by a unanimous Court and the opinion in each case was
written by Mr. Justice Holmes. In the Schenck case the Secretary of the
Socialist party and other defendants had been convicted for circulating
leaflets attacking the Conscription Act. The leaflets stated that conscription was the worst form of despotism and that a conscript was little better than a convict. While advising people not to submit to intimidation, the documents merely advocated peaceful agitation for the
repeal of the Conscription Act. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
it was said:
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have
been within their constitutional rights. But the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
... The question in every case is whether the. words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger5 that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
'"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Amend., Art. I, Const. U. S.
2Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
Trohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 S. Ct. 249 (1919).
'Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919).
5

Italics supplied.
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fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." 6
In the Frohwerk case Mr. Justice Holmes disposed of the freespeech defense by observing that
".... so far as the language of the articles goes there is not much
in them and those beto choose between expressions to be found
'7
fore us in Schenck v. United States."
He followed this by the "little breath enough to kindle a flame" argument that appears quite judicial under circumstances of excitement
but which seems less convincing when considered in the light of more
settled conditions.
The conviction of Eugene Debs was upheld on the basis of the evidence contained in a speech delivered by him in Canton, Ohio on
June 16, 1918. Debs admitted the obstruction of war effort but contended that the Espionage Act was unconstitutional as being in conflict with the First Amendment. In his trial Debs had addressed the
jury in his own behalf in these words:
"I have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone."8
To the argument that the Act was unconstitutional as being an invasion of the right of free speech, Mr. Justice Holmes bluntly responded:
"Without going into further particulars we are of opinion
that the verdict on the fourth count, for obstructing and attempting to obstruct the recruiting service of the United States, must
be sustained." 9
These, and other cases, 10 upholding the application of the Espionage Act make it clear that the Supreme Court offers little protection to
0249

U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).

7249
U. S. 204, 207, 89 S. Ct. 249, 251 (1919).
8
As quoted in 249 U. S. 211, 214, 39 S. Ct. 252, 253 (1919).

89 S. Ct. 252, 254 (1919).
'0See Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 S. Ct. 191 (1919) where Mr.
Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, was of the opinion that the assertion of the free-speech defense in the case did not present any substantial constitutional question. See, also, Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919)
in which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the ground that
the case departed from the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case. For an
interesting discussion of the Abrams case, see Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial
(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 747 and see (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 9 for a further treatment
of the case by the same author. Two other cases upholding the Espionage Act,
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259 (192o) and Pierce v. United.
9249 U. S. 211, 216,
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the free expression of critical opinion in time of war. Even as qualified
by the clear and present danger test laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes
in the Schenck case, it is quite obvious that the decisions sanction the
virtual extinguishment of free discussion. To remonstrate against war
and decry bloodshed must be regarded as peace-time privileges rather
than war-time rights. When the whole energy of a people is directed to
the accomplishment of a vital purpose, the customary protection of individual opinion is promptly and decisively interned. There is no zone
of immunity for the protection of minority opinion under the abnormal conditions of war.
Peace-Time Subversive Activities
W\rhatever may be the justification for war-time suppression of opinion, it would seem that the peace-time approach should evidence greater
toleration. It is to be recalled, however, that the "Red scare" which followed the war was of unparalleled dimensions. Under older Anarchy
statutes or more recent Syndicalism statutes, many States made a concerted effort to stamp out subversive movements regarded as dangerous
to the existing political order. One of the most significant cases decided by the Supreme Court was that of Gitlow v. New York," in which
the defendant had been convicted in New York for the crime of criminal anarchy under a statute which penalized language advocating or
advising the overthrow of organized government. The defendant had
circulated "The Left Wing Manifesto" which proclaimed that
"Revolutionary Socialism does not propose to 'capture' the
bourgeois parliamentary state, but to conquer and destroy it."
States, 252 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct. 205 (192o) elicited dissents by Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Brandeis because it was felt that the majority had, again, departed from
the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case. In the case of Gilbert v. State
of Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 41 S. Ct. 125 (1920), upholding a conviction under a
State statute which made it unlawful to interfere with the enlistment in the military
forces of the United States, Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in the result, Mr. Chief
Justice White dissented on the ground that Congress had occupied the whole field by
statute, and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the basis of the clear and present
danger test. In Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 S. Ct. 352
(1921) the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion from the second class mailing privileges of a newspaper published in violation of the Espionage Act. The decision in
the latter case has been generally criticized. See (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 715: ". . . the
relator, if entitled to the use of the mails at all, was entitled to the second class
privilege ....
Note, also, the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Holmes in the case.
n268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
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In upholding the conviction the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sanford, admitted that
"There was no evidence of any effect resulting
from the pub2
lication and circulation of the Manifesto."'
The Court distinguished the Schenck case on the basis that the Espionage cases dealt with acts, the punishment for which necessitated a judicial appraisal of the danger to be apprehended from the commission
of the acts. The Gitlow case, it was said, involved words with respect
to the use of which the legislature had already found the existence of
danger. In this connection Mr. Justice Holmes registered a dissent, in
which Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, which relied upon the clear and
present danger test of the Schenck case.
The Supreme Court in the Gitlow case reached one conclusion, however, that served to clarify a point that had been, theretofore, obscurethe relationship between the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
majority opinion declared:
"For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States."' 3
The Court dismissed a statement to the contrary in PrudentialIns. Co.
v. Cheek,14 as not determinative of the question. While one may fail to
be impressed by the narrow distinction 15 drawn between the prohibited
acts of the Schenck case and the proscribed words of the Gitlow case as
a means of avoiding judicial determination of clear and present danger,
the dictum in the latter case that unwarranted restriction of opinion
by a State violates the Fourteenth Amendment represents an unqualified advance.' 6 The long-range protection inherent in the latter position embodies the prospect of ultimate good.
The Gitlow case was followed by that of Whitney v. California17 in
12268 U. S. 652, 656, 45 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1925).

11268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 63o (1925).
1"259 U. S. 530, 543, 42 S. Ct. 516, 522 (1922).
1

5See (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 527 expressing the view that the Gitlow case
seriously modified the clear and present danger test of the Schenck case.
"eBut see Warren, The New Liberty Under the 14th Amendment (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 431, 464: "Is it, or is it not, a good thing that the legislation enacted by
each State to meet local conditions and to regulate local relations should be standardized, by being forced to comply to a new definition of 'liberty' applied to every
State by the judicial branch of the National Government?"
1 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927).
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1927 in which the Court upheld a conviction under the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act for participation in the organization of the
Communist Labor Party in that state. The organization was found to
be one which advocated force and violence in the attainment of its objectives. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the majority, through Mr. Justice Sanford, declared:
"The essence of the offense denounced by the Act is the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of
the desired ends through the advocacy and use of criminal and
unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy. That such united and joint action involves even greater
danger to the public peace and security8 than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals is clear."'
Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice Holmes joined, concurred in the result only because the defendant had not properly raised
the issue of "present danger." On the merits, Mr. Justice Brandeis broke
through the crust of judicial calm to proclaim:
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty ....
Only an emergency can justify
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.9 Such, in my opinion, is the command of
the Constitution."'
On the same day that the Whitney case was decided the Court, in
the case of Fiske v. Kansas,20 unanimously reversed a conviction under
the Kansas Syndicalism statute. The only evidence of the violation of
the Act was that the defendant had circulated the preamble to the Constitution of the I. W. W. which advocated the abolition of the "wage
system" but in which no reference to force or violence was discovered.
The Syndicalism Act was not held unconstitutional but the application
of the statute to a defendant, against whom the evidence was unconvincing, was held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
dictum in the Gitlow case that freedom of speech was a right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by a State had
now become the basis of actual decision.
Again, in Stromberg v. California,21 the Court reversed a conviction based upon the violation of a statute, one section of which made
it a crime to display the red flag as an emblem of opposition to or-

18274
"274
"274
2283

U. S.
U. S.
U. S.
U. S.

357, 371, 47 S. Ct. 641, 647 (1927).
357, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641 , 648 (1927).
380, 47 S. Ct. 655 (1927).
359, 51 S. Ct. 432 (1931).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. i

ganized government. In the trial of the defendant, a nineteen year old
girl, the California court had instructed the jury that any one section
of the statute was enough to sustain the conviction. While not condemning the statute as a whole, the Supreme Court held the "red flag"
section to be unconstitutional in that it was vague and indefinite. Mr.
Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented on the ground
that the conviction should be upheld under the other sections of the
statute. It would appear that the Court, in the early thirties, was beginning to adopt a more tolerant outlook in the handing of such cases.
The Stromberg decision prompted the remark in one of the law reviews of California that
"The case is of interest in showing the more liberal attitude
22
recently developed in the United States Supreme Court."
In 1937 the Supreme Court decided the case of De longe v.
Oregon.23 In that case the accused had been convicted under the Oregon Syndicalism statute and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for
assisting in the conduct of a public meeting, otherwise lawful, which
was held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court. (Mr.
Justice Stone not participating) unanimously concluded that the conviction should be set aside. In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
it was pointed out that
"Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights
which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the 14 th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to'24those of free speech and free press
and is equally fundamental.
The Court was of opinion that a meeting was not unlawful merely because it was held under the auspices of the Communist Party. It is to
be noted that freedom of assembly, for the first time, was brought
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this connection it has been observed that
"Extension of the due process clause to include the right of
peaceable assembly practically completes the Supreme Court's
transcription of the personal
liberties of the First Amendment
25
into the Fourteenth."
In Herndon v. Lowry 26 the defendant, Angelo Herndon, a negro,
2(1931) 5 So. Calif. L. Rev. 172, 173.
2299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937)299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937).
*(1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 489.
28301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732 (1937).
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had been sent from Kentucky to Atlanta, Georgia to persuade negroes
to join the Communist Party. He held three meetings and was arrested.
In his room was found a great bulk of radical Communist literature,
but there was no proof he had circulated any of the material. He was
convicted of an attempt to incite to insurrection under a statute, 27 the
pertinent section of which, defined the offense in these words:
"Any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to
join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the
State shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection."
The conviction of the defendant was affirmed by the State court 2s
which held that the statute applied whether or not immediate violence
was threatened.
In a habeas corpus proceeding which reached the Supreme Court
it was decided that the Georgia statute, as construed and applied, was
so vague and uncertain as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Roberts declared:
"The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to
a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change
of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have
foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct
of others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus set
to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily
of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth
violates the guarantees
29
Amendment."
On the issue of the statute's vagueness, Mr. Justice Van Devanter voiced
a dissent which was joined in by Justices McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler. In view of the Court's five-to-four division on the issue of
vagueness, the decision all the more demonstrates the willingness of
the Court's majority to bring conduct involving freedom of speech
within the protection of the constitutional guarantees. The case would
seem to be but another manifestation of that growing liberality of attitude to which previous reference has been made.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization30 the longstanding dispute between Mayor Hague of Jersey City and the C. I. 0.
was finally passed on by the Supreme Court in reviewing an injunction
"Section 56 of the Penal Code (Ga. Code 1933, § 26-902).
2'Hemdon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S. E. 597 (1934). Rehearing denied, Herndon
v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 176 S. E. 62o (1934).
301 U. S. 242, 263, 57 S. Ct. 732, 742 (1937).
3'3o7 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).

200
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restraining the continuance of interference by the city officials with
the constitutional rights of the protesting parties. The bill alleged that
under ordinances of Jersey City these parties had been denied the right
to use public buildings, streets and parks for lawful assemblies and
had been prevented from circulating leaflets and pamphlets in public
places. It was claimed that the conduct of the city officials had been
discriminatory and amounted to unconstitutional interference with
freedom of speech and assembly.
In upholding the rights of speech and assembly the majority could
find no common ground of reason to sustain the decision. The opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts, in which Mr. Justice Black concurred, stated:
"...
it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss
these topics [National legislation], and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in
the citizenship of the United States which the [Fourteenth]
Amendment protects." 31
In resorting to the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a source of constitutional right, Mr. Justice Roberts
put the protection on an exceedingly narrow basis. This clause is a
protection to citizens only and with respect to those rights which grow
out of Federal citizenship. Does the opinion imply that an assembly to
discuss State legislation would not be protected? Does the opinion lead
to the inference that non-citizens have no right to assemble to discuss
anything? If such conceivable doctrine be not unsound, it is at least
unfortunate.
In a separate opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Reed, it was
stated by Mr. Justice Stone:
"It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court,
without a dissenting voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... It has never
been held that either is a privilege or immunity peculiar to citizenship of the United States, to which alone the privileges and
immunities clause refers .... -32
The logic of this position commends itself more than does that employed by Mr. Justice Roberts. The due process clause is a living, growing and vital source of protection. The privileges and immunities
clause is restrictive in application and all but judicially decadent. Its
3'307 U. S. 496, 512, 59 S. Ct. 954, 962 (1939).
23o7 U. S. 496, 519, 59 S. Ct. 954, 965 (1939).
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resurrection for this purpose is of dubious value. One is constrained to
agree with the comment that
".. . it is regrettable that in a case of such public notoriety the
Court did not invoke squarely
the established doctrines for the
33
defense of civil liberties."
The Court's handling of this highly controversial case is, to say the
least, both disappointing and confusing. The positions taken by the
individual members of the Court may be summarized as follows:
Mr. Justice Roberts (Mr. Justice Black concurring) held that
the rights were protected by the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Stone (Mr. Justice Reed concurring) held that the
rights were protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes concurred with Mr. Justice Robberts "on the merits."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the hearing or the determination of the case.
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler wrote dissenting opinions.
It is to be noted that the maximum strength mustered for any one of
the positions assumed does not represent more than one-third of the
Court's membership. One naturally regrets that in a case of this importance the reasoning was so indecisive. It is difficult to deduce any
settled principle from this discordant medley of concurrence and dissent. In result, only, can the case be regarded as satisfactory.
Freedom of the Press
Within two weeks of the 1931 decision of the Stromberg case,34 in
which the Supreme Court had given evidence of a new liberality of
opinion in reversing a conviction under the California "red flag" statute, the case of Near v. Minnesota35 was disposed of by the Court. This
decision, involving the freedom of the press, provided still more striking evidence of a judicial intent to safeguard the free expression of
opinion. A Minnesota statute36 of 1925 provided for the abatement of
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers and periodicals as
public nuisances. The defendant, whose past conduct had been decidedly unsavory, made an unprincipled and defamatory attack upon
m(i939) 59 Col. L. Rev. 1237, 1244.

'Supra. n.

21.

2283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
=Chap. 285, Session Laws of Minn., 1925.
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public officials in the Saturday Press. He was enjoined under the statute from continuing the publication of the newspaper because of its
scurrilous and defamatory content. The Supreme Court pronounced
the statute unconstitutional because its application and enforcement
embodied "the essence of censorship." 37
In the majority opinion, written by "Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, it
was stated:
"The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication."3 8
The belief that the proper remedy was to be found in the application
of the libel laws was thus expressed:
"The fact that for approximately one hundred and fifty years
there has been almost an entire absence of attempts to impose
previous restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance
of public officers is significant of the deep-seated conviction that
such restraints would violate constitutional right. Public officers,
whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free
discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations
in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals."'39
That the decision was, in no sense, predicated upon the justifiable
quality of the defendant's conduct appeared obvious from the following excerpt from the opinion:
"We should add that this decision rests upon the operation
and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the
truth of the charges contained in the particular periodical. The
fact that the public officers named in this case, and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed to
be impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute
im40
poses an unconstitutional restraint upon publication."
Mr. Justice Butler (speaking also for Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland) gave expression to this pointed dissent:
"It is well known, as found by the state Supreme Court, that
-283 U. S. 697, 713,
38283 U. S. 697, 713,
3'283 U. S. 697, 718,
40283 U. S. 697, 723,

51 S. Ct. 625, 6go (1931).

51 S. Ct. 625, 63o (1931).
51 S. Cf. 625, 632 (1931).
51 S. Ct. 625, 633 (1931).
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existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the kind of business and publications that are
shown in this case. The doctrine that measures such as the one
before us are invalid because they operate as previous restraints
to infringe freedom of the press exposes the peace and good order
of every community and the business and private affairs of every
individual to the constant and protracted false and malicious
assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have purpose and
sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or
program for oppression, blackmail or extortion." 41
Without detracting from the force of the dissenting argument it
would appear nevertheless true that "previous restraint" embraces the
prospect of great abuse. The balance of social interest would seem to
favor the majority position. That the laws of libel are not wholly efficacious in dealing with a "program for oppression, blackmail or extortion" may be admitted. The appraisal of doctrine, however, must
proceed with a view to ultimate advantage. This advantage seems furthered by absence of "previous restraint." That a less-favored position
is an unconstitutional one requires explanation. In view of our constitutional history, the specific restrictions of the First Amendment and
the expanding protection accorded to freedom of speech and of the
press under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
might it not be suggested that legislation impinging upon these basic
immunities should be stripped of its presumptive validity? Such suggestion would afford a justification for the Near decision that would
otherwise require more extended reasoning.
The decision in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 42 in 1936 was by a
unanimous Court. Suit had been brought by nine publishers of Louisiana newspapers to enjoin the enforcement of a Louisiana statute of
1934 levying a two per cent license tax on the gross receipts from advertising in papers with a circulation of more than twenty thousand copies
per week. In holding the statute unconstitutional as in conflict with the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said:
"The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money
from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in vir"283 U. S. 697, 737, 52 St. Ct. 625, 638 (1931).
-297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936).
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tue of the constitutional guarantees. A free press stands as one
of the great interpreters between the government and
the peo43
ple. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."
The Court pointed out that by placing the decision on the due process
clause it was unnecessary to determine whether the statute denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In this case the Court quite obviously looked behind the scenes to
discover in the Louisiana political situation a ruthless attempt to
throttle freedom of expression in opposition to the controlling political regime of the State. The unanimous quality of the declaration
served notice to political machines that devious attacks upon the freedom of the press would meet with judicial resistance. The decision fortified the "no censorship" position which had been taken in the Near
case.
In Associated Press v. Labor Board,44 the Court in 1937 rendered
another five-to-four decision on the issue of freedom of the press. The
four dissenting Justices were the same who dissented in the Near case.
This time, however, the dissenters came to the defense of the press
whereas in the Near case they were found on the other side. The issue
in the case was whether the National Labor Relations Board could
compel the Associated Press to reinstate a discharged editorial writer
with back pay. After holding that Congress had the power to regulate
the business of the Associated Press under its control of interstate commerce, the majority held that the application of the National Labor
Relations Act was not in violation of the constitutional rights protected by the First Amendment and that the reinstatement order of
the Labor Board was valid.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Roberts, called attention to the fact that
"The business of the Associated Press is not immune from
regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. 4 3
The Court indicated that the right to discharge such employee was unlimited except for his labor union activities.
'"297 U. S. 233, 250, 56 S. Ct. 44, 449
"301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
"301

(1936).

U. S. 103, 132, 57 S. Ct. 650, 656 (1937).
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Mr. Justice Sutherland, with whom Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler agreed, entered a stirring dissent. He said:
"No one can read the long history which records the stern
and often bloody struggles by which these cardinal rights were
secured, without realizing how necessary it is to preserve them
against any infringement, however slight." 46
One wonders why this solicitude for the press might not have found
expression in the Near case. The dissent remarked on the difference of
status between an editorial writer and one employed in the mechanical
and purely clerical work of the press. The "halt at the threshold" argument was effectively employed against incipient invasion of constitutional right.
The dissenting opinion ended on a note of high emotional quality:
"Do the people of this land-in the providence of God, favored, as they sometimes boast, above all others in the plentitude
of their liberties-desire to preserve those so carefully protected
by the First Amendment: liberty of religious worship, freedom
of speech and of the press, and the right as freemen peaceably to
assemble and petition their government for a redress of grievances? If so, let them withstand all beginnings of encroachment.
For the saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a
vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors failed to
47
stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time."

Would there be those uncharitable enough to harbor the suspicion
that this lyrical passage from the pen of the gifted Justice was inspired
not only by love of the press but also by a lack of regard for the practices of the Labor Board? Valid arguments may, of course, be advanced
in behalf of both majority and minority positions. The protection of
the Labor Board might better have been directed to the safeguarding
of the rights of the more ordinary group of employees without being
extended to members of the staff who might occupy positions more intimately connected with possible matters of policy and management.
When one considers the extent to which the press, in many lands, has
been subject to governmental interference, no suggestion of debatable
encroachment by administrative boards should merit judicial indulgence. For an administrative ruling to invade the editorial room and
directly affect its personnel may offer prospect of mischief that will outweigh the meager gain to labor which the case represents.
In 1938 the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of
"30,

'7o

U. S. 103, 135, 57 S. Ct. 65o, 657 (1937).
U. S. 103, 141, 57 S. Ct. 650, 659 (1937).
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Lovell v. City of Griffin.48 A city ordinance forbade as a nuisance the
distribution, by hand or otherwise, of literature of any kind without
first obtaining written permisson from the City Manager. The defendant was c6nvicted of violation of the ordinance in distributing religious tracts. The Court was of the unanimous opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo not participating, that the ordinance violated due process by invading freedom of the press.
In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes it was again pointed
out that
"Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress,
are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state action." 49
This position, dating from the Gitlow pronouncement 0 in 1925, has
become a judicial commonplace. Not so commonplace, however, is the
idea that such handbill regulations impinge upon freedom of the press.
The opinion explained that
"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These
indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as
the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history
abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinon." 51
It is doubtful whether the legal profession anticipated this ruling.
The case provides evidence of an intent on the part of the Court to
keep open the channels of information. In the light of such purpose
the decision is highly significant. One practical aspect of the holding
is indicated in this comment:
"The instant case holding that handbills merit the same protection as newspapers is of practical importance to minority
groups which might otherwise be materially hampered in advocating their doctrines. The language of many municipal ordi'5 2
nances will no doubt need revision in the light of this opinion."
That there is need for revising the language of existing handbill
485o 3 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
4"50 3 U. S. 444, 450, 58 S. Ct. 666, 668 (1938).
Supra, n. 13.
51303 U. S. 444, 452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 669 (1938).
5'(1938) 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 675, 676.
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ordinances is evidenced by the opinion53 handed down by the Supreme Court in November of the past year. Convictions under four
different handbill ordinances were reversed in this one opinion. The
ordinances held to be invalid were those of Irvington, New Jersey; Los
Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Worcester, Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated
in his opinion:
"Four cases are here, each of which presents the question
whether regulations embodied in a municipal ordinance abridge
the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." 54
He concluded that
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these
may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion."m
The Court, in protecting the rights of pamphleteers, in viewing the
problem in a realistic way. It is concerned with the circulation of "information and opinion." It is not to be supposed that the Court is
throwing the cloak of immunity around advertising dodgers or commercial solicitation. 56 Ordinances designed to prevent the littering of
streets and the annoyance of householders, however, must not be employed to curtail the constitutional right of religious, political and economic groups to disseminate information and opinion favorable to
their cause. Democratic institutions thrive on liberty and languish from
its restraint. Events may prove that the typewriter is mightier than the
tank and that the mimeograph will become the symbol of a changing
order. The Supreme Court gives them judicial blessing and safeguards
them from the doctrine of "previous restraint."
Pursuit of Learning
No examination of freedom of opinion should fail to take into account the freedom of teaching and learning identified with educational
practice. For the State to maintain a system of public education is a
commendable effort of government and one of its recognized responsi5(1) Schneider v. State of New Jersey, (2) Young v. People of State of California,
(3) Snyder v. City of Milwaukee, (4) Nichols et al. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts-6o S. Ct. 146 (1939)r46o S. Ct. 146, 147 (1939).
56o S. Ct. 146, 150 (1939).
5See 60 S. Ct. 146, 152 (1939).
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bilities. For designing agencies to undermine freedom of instruction,
however, is little better than contributing to the delinquency of the
young. The whole character of a people can be changed in a relatively
short time by any government that is accorded full and unrestricted
control over the developing mind of youth. No weapon for standardized mass-thinking and the elimination of individualized opinion is so
powerful as a unified, State-dominated system of instruction. When
the brain is saturated with the compulsory doctrines of State, a whole
population may be made the unsuspecting victims of seduced opinion.
In the interest of avoiding the prospect of standardization that is inherent in State-provided education, the integrity of private schools
should be scrupulously respected. This is a matter that should be accorded unrelaxed attention.
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, exercised restraint upon legislative efforts designed to curtail the independence of private instruction. In 1923 the Court decided the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,57 pronouncing unconstitutional a Nebraska statute, one section of which
prohibited the teaching of any language, other than English, to a child
who had not passed the eighth grade. The statute, by its terms, applied
to private, denominational, parochial or public schools. The defendant,
a teacher in a parochial school, was convicted for teaching German to
a child of ten who had not passed the required grade. In condemning
the application of the statute to private schools, Mr. Justice McReynolds stated in the majority opinion:
"That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as those
born with English on the tongue.... We are constrained to conclude that the statute is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State."8
Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Mr. Justice Sutherland agreed, ex9
pressed the opinion in Bartels v. IowarP
disposing of a similar statute,
that
"Youth is the time when familiarity with
a language is established ....

I am not prepared to say that it is unreasonable

to provide that in his early years he shall hear and speak only
English at school."6 0
39o, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
U. S. 390, 401, 403, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627, 628
"262 U. S. 404, 43 S. Ct. 628 (1923).
'0262 U. S. 404, 412, 43 S. Ct. 628, 63o (1923).
'262 U. S.
M262

(1923).
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This rivulet of argument, happily, found its way into the sea of dissent.
In view of the fact that nearly one-half of the States had adopted statutes of this type, it is evident that a concerted effort had been made to
bring private instruction within the ambit of public control. For the
Supreme Court to declare such statutes an arbitrary invasion of the
freedom of instruction came as a shock to the groups that had instigated the legislative crusade. Mr. Justice Holmes' penchant for upholding legislation placed him in the dubious company of professional
patriots. Mr. Justice Sutherland's position does not merit the charity
of this explanation.
In the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,61 in 1925, the Court passed
upon the validity of an Oregon statute that made compulsory the attendance in public schools of all children between ages eight to sixteen. Private schools had secured temporary restraining orders preventing the enforcement of the statute. Attorneys representing the State
of Oregon advanced this argument to sustain the validity of the legislation:
"At present, the vast majority of the private schools in the
country are conducted by members of some particular religious
belief. They may be followed, however, by those organized and
controlled by believers in certain economic doctrines entirely
destructive of the fundamentals of our government. Can it be
contended that there is no way in which a State can prevent the
entire education of a considerable portion of its future citizens
and conducted by bolshevists, syndicalists and
being controlled
62
communists?"
It is to be noted that what counsel feared was the economic "isms"
likely to be propagated by the sinister "ists." The Court, however,
unanimously rejected this attenuated method of forestalling objectionable doctrine. In an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds it was pointedly remarked:
"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high63 duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."
violation of the due process clause of
The statute was held to be ith
1268 U. S. 5i0, 45 S. Ct. 57i (1925).
e'268 U. S. 510, 526 (1925).
e'268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. No one should ignore the significant character of this decision. The Pierce case, coupled with the Meyer holding,
effectively checked the drive to control the freedom of private instrucdon. That the State may establish certain standards of curriculum and
qualification for teachers in private schools admitting children of compulsory school age, is readily conceded. The theory, however, that private education may be changed into education that is virtually public,
or that school-age children may be withdrawn from private schools by
State decree, has been decisively repudiated. Had the Supreme Court
resolved this issue to the contrary, it is difficult to determine where the
zeal for uniformity would have stopped.
This judicial determination to safeguard the freedom of private in64
struction was reaffirmed in the later case of Farringtonv. Tokushige
in which the Court concluded that Hawaiian legislation, which attempted the minute regulation of the numerous foreign language
schools of that territory, was unconstitutional. Reliance was placed
upon the Meyer and Pierce cases as authority for the conclusion. Since
the issue arose in Federal territory, the decision was based upon the
restraint of the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. It is obvious, therefore, that both State and Federal agencies of government
are subject to pronounced constitutional limitations in the attempted
interference with the operation of private schools.
It is not without significance that the Supreme Court has found occasion to say a word about the conduct of State-supported instruction.
In the case of Missouri v. Canada6 5 the Court gave warning against discriminations by the States in the management of public institutions of
learning. In that case it was declared that the denial of admission to a
negro citizen who wished to enroll in the law department of the State
university denied the equal protection of the laws. While segregation
of the white from other races is permitted, the State is under the constitutional obligation to provide separate facilities to the excluded race.
In the absence of separate facilities, the Court concluded that all qualified citizens had equal right of admission to the instruction provided
by the State. This indicates an intention to keep open the channels of
public instruction to the extent that a qualified citizen may have that
equal access to learning which will contribute to the cultivation of enlightened opinion.
In view of these cases it must be said that the Supreme Court has
'273 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 406 (1927).

6'305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct.

232

(1938).
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exercised its judicial power to safeguard fundamental rights incident
to the pursuit of learning. It is reasonable to suppose that the Court
has not exhausted the scope of protection in this regard. What the
Court has already done constitutes a genuine contribution to the safeguarding of instructional freedom.
Summary and Conclusion
. It is hoped that this examination has served to indicate the postwar attitude of the Supreme Court toward freedom of opinon. It appears that this attitude has been, on the whole, one of surprising liberality. It is to be admitted that the handling of the Espionage cases,
growing out of the war, provided little evidence of impending liberalism in this particular. It is likewise true that the "Red scare" led to unfortunate decisions in the Gitlow and Whitney cases in 1925 and 1927
respectively. It is to be observed, however, that these two cases marked
the end of the Supreme Court's willingness to sustain legislation designed to restrict the free expression of opinion.
For almost fifteen years the Court has pursued an unbroken course
of extending judicial protection to freedom of speech, press and assembly. In the Fiske case a member of the I.W.W. was protected against
the application of the Kansas Syndicalism Act. The "red flag" statute
of California was held invalid in the Stromberg decision. In the case of
De Jonge v. Oregon the right of peaceable assembly was vindicated.
The court granted habeas corpus in the Herndon case to safeguard the
freedom of speech of a negro communist. Though the reasoning seems
unsatisfactory, the Hague controversy resulted in an injunction to prevent interference with the constitutional rights of members of the
C.I.O.
For the past decade the Supreme Court has been unquestionably
diligent in preserving the freedom of the press. In the Near case the
doctrine of "previous restraint" was condemned. A tax, designed to
limit newspaper circulation, was held unconstitutional in the Grosjean
appeal. The five-to-four decision, disallowing the free-press defense in
the Associated Press case, was complicated by protection-to-labor considerations and is generally defended by professed liberals. The handbill cases unqualifiedly extended freedom of the press to embrace
pamphlets and circulars disseminating matters of opinion.
Since 1923 the integrity of private instruction has received repeated
judicial support. The Meyer case struck down the Nebraska language
law as applied to private schools. Compulsory attendance upon public
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schools was denied validity in the Pierce case. Legislation interfering
with the management of private schools in Hawaii was declared unconstitutional in the Farringtoncase, while Missouri v. Canada prohibited discrimination in the treatment of citizens qualified to attend
State-supported institutions.
It is submitted that these cases reflect a settled determination on
the part of the Court to safeguard freedom of opinion. The Fourteenth
Amendment, in particular, has been given an ever-widening application. This steady advance holds the promise of still more extended protection. The social implications of the present judicial attitude are apparent. Minority groups are freed from many restrictive practices previously common. Those who subscribe to the paradox of restraint as a
means to freedom are naturally disappointed. Those who believe that
the last word is never said in the everlasting search for social betterment may take heart.
Unless the right of free speech and press protects unpopular opinion the constitutional safeguard is a delusion. One does not need the
protection of the Constitution to endorse the Ten Commandments or
to advocate the Golden Rule. When a group program goes beyond the
expression of opinion and takes the form of overt acts directed to the
immediate purpose of force and violence, the right of government to
protect itself from threatened danger cannot be denied. The enjoyment of all rights is subject to the rule of reason. The advantages inherent in social stability are obvious but the dangers inherent in social
stagnation are equally apparent. Only a warped philosophy could regard an imprisoned mind and a silenced tongue as societal assets.
The history of American political development reveals the fear of
oppressive government at every step. The specific safeguards embodied
in both Federal and State Bills of Rights reflect the purpose of the
American people to be free from arbitrary restraints upon freedom of
opinion. The safeguarding of this purpose is a high judicial task, in the
performance of which the Supreme Court is no longer faltering. The
course which is being pursued by the Court merits the support of those
who have faith in the ultimate value of truth.
Impressed with the necessity of keeping open the channels of free
opinion, the writer takes occasion to reiterate the thought he expressed
in connection with the Near case-that, in the vindication of these basic
rights specifically safeguarded from governmental interference, the customary presumption of validity be withheld from encroaching legislation. The burden of explanation should be placed upon government
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to justify the necessity for any direct invasion of this zone of constitutional immunity. In practice, the Court seems to be drifting in this
direction. Indeed, the very latest decisions by the Court in the Thornhill v. Alabama66 and Carlson v. California67 cases, handed down on
April 22, 194o, indicate that no real presumption of validity is accorded to legislative limitations upon freedom of discussion. In both
cases, anti-picketing legislation was declared to be an unconstitutional
interference with the free expression of opinion. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Murphy, with only Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting, the
Court declared in the former case:
"In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution." 6s
The fact that picketing involves the prospect of personal violence and
public disturbance provoked no comment concerning presumptive
validity. In most of the cases dealing with the safeguarding of free
opinion one finds judicial silence in this respect. An outright declaration that such presumptions no longer obtain where legislation attempts to restrict the area of free discussion would serve to clarify the
judicial attitude.
The final place to be occupied by the Supreme Court in our constitutional system is not certain. Grave social and economic problems
press for solution. The limit to legitimate governmental activity and
regulation has perhaps not been reached. Suggested remedies for economic ills are subject to an understandable difference of opinion and
provide the occasion for justifiable debate. Experimentation should be
permitted a wide lattitude, unhampered by judicial restraint. Restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court in this field no longer merit the
support of the American people. After all, the Supreme Court is not
a negative Congress, to debate the wisdom of method.
In safeguarding the more basic rights of free speech, press and opinion, however, the Court is charged with a responsibility which it should
not shirk. This is not a field for reasonable debate. The democratic
way of life calls for the unrestricted interplay of individual thought.
To place legislative restrictions upon free discussion is to jeopardize
the orderly processes of social change. The attitude of the Court for
c-6o S. Ct. 736 (194o).
6 6o S. Ct. 746 (1940).
6o S. Ct. 736, 744 (1940).
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the past several years leads to the belief that judicial protection will
continue. To fortify that protection by putting the burden on government to justify an impinging course should be the next step in the
defense of the constitutional right to freedom of opinion.

